English Translation of Dharmapala's Commentary by Sastri, N. Aiyaswami
ENGLISH TRANSLATION OF DHARMA-PAIA'S 
COMMENTARY 
In order to light up the wisdom in the poisoned-and dull-
minded men and in order to let them extirpate their evils who 
spoke, I pay homage to Him and investigate the / true/ 
meaning of that. 
The Sastra says:- "Of the consciommess of the eye, and 
others:-
The fruit of investigation comprises the rejection of what 
is rejectable and adoption of what is worth adopting, therefore 
what is rejectable and the opponents' perverted cause 
thereof are demonstrated here. 
The word "others" (adi) includes the five-fold consciou-
sness which arises having support of the material 0 bject sand 
the senses as accepted by other schools of philosophy. They 
conceive that the senses are directed each to an [invariabl~ 
external] real object. But the consciousness born of the mind 
is not so; for it is not directed to an invariable real object, 
but to an object which is only conventionally true, for exam-
I 
pIe, the chariot and the like. Though it may be permitted 
that the non-senseous consciousness is conditioned by a 
2 
real object and becomes endowed with its image yet it also 
grasps an object which is not its own and which lacks form 
reflected in the consciousness. But for the consciousness of 
of the eye and others, there is established a separate object 
invariably associated with each of the senses. Therefore no 
effort is needed( to include it in (iidi) 
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Moreover, the atom-form which is to be cognized by the 
contemplation- achieved knowledge never, really, falls within 
the perview of the discriminative thought (tarka-mano-vij-
iifJ,ma); and again it appears as though it is perceivable, and it 
is to be understood (in this Sastra) that it becomes object 
(·f only the wisdom born of listning and thinking (huf-cinta.) 
1 hus the object of the ordinary non-sensuous consciousness 
becomes absolutely non-existent; for it grasps neither the atom 
nor the aggregate as iilarnbana.. Things past and future are 
unreal like unman if est things [and hence cannot act as objects 
to it ]. For this reason the word "others" is said to include the 
body of five sorts of consciousness 
2a 
Then; if [you say] the mind cognizes whichever is brou-
3 
ght home by the sensuous consciousness; how is that also 
possible? It cannot take place either in the Slm-e moment of 
the sensuous consciousness or in the immediate next moment; 
for it takes as its iilambana the past things [which are unreal] 
Nor does it take so the present things; because the letter are 
cognized by the sensuous consciousness. 
[If you say that] the non-sensuous consciousness grasps 
naturally the external object of its own accord, then there 
4 
wi1l not possibly exist the blind and deaf, etc. [To accept] 
a sense-faculty other than the eye, etc. is contradictory to 
() 
the inferantial knowledge. The denial of the extra mate-
rial object [which may suit to the non-sensuous cons-
ciousnes~] being accepted, there is no need to entertain 
any bias for inclusion of the non-sensuous consciousness 
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In iidi. To th~ visual consciousness, etc. there are mate-
rial things functioning as supporting causes. [There is no 
such thing for the non·sensuous cinsciousuess]. The thing-
5a 
like Avijiiapti is in the nature of non- action; hence it is 
admitted as a non-existent thing. Likewise the mind as 
a sense-faculty is to be denied. 
1 he [external] object-cause (iilambano), 
(I 
would be perceptible. Since it consists in the nature 
of cognized aspect of the mind and since it (causes to) 
move astray in a wrong and perverted path, nature of 
the external thing as a!ambana is' rejected in order to 
establish a right view. Basing upJn it, its nature of being 
support is also rejected. However, (the author) will 
es:ablish that it is a visible aspect (riipfl) of the forc'.;s 
7 
which constitute the senses and operate simultaneously 
(with the consciousness). 
"An external thing" 
'.( he opponents hold that there is an external thing 
apart from the mind. This exhibits their pervertedness. 
They hold that the thing other than the mind is called 
artha because it is cognized (according to them). 
How could you say: the mind grasps the aggregate 
of atoms (Sanghata), and in case there exists no aggregate 
as real it cught to ce a substance (= atom)? There are 
logical errors as will be stated below. That ( = your 
standpoint) IS contradictory to preceding and following 
reasons, but it causes no harm to me. As for you, it 
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is accepted by you that the mind grasps the substance 
as well as the aggregate. We shall demonstrate other 
errors on your thesis, therefore this error IS presently 
drop.nd. 
"They postulate the Subtle atoms" 
Though the subtle atoms being assembled perish no 
7a 
sooner than they appear, nevertheless each atom becomes 
separately iilambana and not in their a~gregate form, For 
example. the visible (rapa) and others, thoush they are 
simultaneously present before the senses, become objects 
[only of their respective senses] without any confusion on 
account of the fact that the faculty of grasping a parti-
cular object is fixedly assigned to each sense. Although 
things are endowed with the capacity being definite and 
7b 
distinguished from each other, yet each atom serves as 
object separately. (Syllogism will be this: Atoms are objects] 
"Because the atom serves as the cause for that". 
[But no example has been giv~n here]. 
The word "that" means the consciousness of the 
eye, etc. It arises on contact (of the sense-organ) with 
object which is constituted of parts. So say some (Adiryas): 
Among the causes that which acts as the productive 
8 
cause becomes its actual object. 
"Others postulate the aggregate of atoms" 
The ad vocate of this thesis say that the aggregate 
formed of atoms serves as the actual object of consci-
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ousness. [Here also the syllogism will be this: The 
aggregate is iilamhana ; 
"Because consciousness arises representing the image 
of the aggregate of atoms". (No example is 
available here). 
The aggregate is believed 
c0nsciousness, since the latter 
It is so as somebody says: 
to be the actual object of 
is born of the. aggregate. 
"A thing whose form is 
9 
represented in a consciousness is really its object" I hese 
9a 
two advocates say: "Con~ciousncss is endowed with that 
image and it is logically correct. 
10 
When the hetu is stated, that hetu has no example. 
Just as the ( allVaya -) hetu etc. achieve (in the paksa-hetu ) 
II 
the nature of the bring hetu, etc. the atom and the aggregate 
($iimiinya) which are in the nature of alambana achieve 
that. If you accept that the alambana is not within the cons-
ciousness itself but exists substantially outside of it, there 
12 
will be contradiction with dharmin (= Sasana~=teaching). 
13 
The (Mahayana) dharma does not accept that there exists 
iilambana externally. This (proposition) has been accepted 
by opponents also, and (so) the same is considered to be 
drHiillta, example. Ii what is stated (by opponents is 
only example), probandum also will be only what is 
14 
accepted by opponents. ( 1 he commentator) says having 
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in view the first (two) syllogisms, prama:rJas (set forth by 
the opponents): "The hetus, proposition which are the 
source of the dispute are mere prepositions displaying 
the hetus. They not, in fact, heLUs because there exists 
15 
no example accepted by both parties." Hence it follows: 
in what manner may the representation of the image in 
consciousness be established as valid reason? 
Then the author will show a conclusive reasoning. By em-
ploying the ablative usage, the consent of opponents has 
been exhibited. 
(I a) H Though atom serves as the cause" 
as accepted generally, nevertheless the atom serves as no 
cause because things that are non-existent, i. e., non-co-
gnized are bereft of their own nature. Though the selves 
of atoms may act' as the cause of consciousness, they 
serves as iilambana only while uncollected together. 
(I c) "Because the consciousness does not bear the 
image of that " 
i. e. of atoms. 
(ld) "Atoms are not the objects of the sensuous 
consciousness like the senses" 
Just as a sense-faculty, though it serves as the base 
to the conscionsness and to the contact with the object 
never becomes its object; because it does not bee.r the 
image of the sense faculty. The same is the case with 
atoms. Hence it is concluded that what do not posses 
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the image of comciousness are never considered to be its 
objects. 
Therefore the author says:-
"That is the object, etc". 
" Its own being" means the image of cons-
ciousness itself. H It is cognized precisely" means" it is 
determined " 
How is it cognized precisely? 
"Because it arises in that form" 
The idea of the passage is this: Consciousness arises 
in a form similar to that of an object (grahyabhiiga). 
When there is a mutual co-ordination between the cons-
ciousness and its objE'ct then we call it precisely cognizi ng the 
16 
object by consciousness. (The commentary criticises:) When 
there is no cognizable other than consciousness, how is 
it possible that the cognizable causes the consciousness 
to arise? (You may assume thus:) there is already 
the image of the object (in the atom); when that object-
17 
image is brought hJme in the self of c )nscioumess just 
like an image in the mirror, it is considered that the 
consciousness has precisely cognized its object . (and also 
that the latter has produced the former). Neverthelss 
the consciousness exhibits no image of each atom where-
by the atom would become the actual object. 
Though the atom is considered to be the cause, it 
becom::s by no means the actual object. 
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"like the sense-organ" 
If you accept that whichever is cause, becomes object, 
then the sense - faculty alSoO could possibly become object 
of eonsciousness. The other reason previously stated, viz. 
possession of the image by consciousness suffers a fallacy 
of its being not established: this ha~ been pointed out already. 
Thus the follow1ng is the main purport: The mere 
capacity of being cause is not sole criterion for its being 
object of consciousness. (Accepting this proposition) the 
sense-faculty would also assume the nature of being 
iilambana, (since it acts as cause for conciousness). If 
(you persist that) the said reason will be a factor (to 
achieve the proposition), does it follow that the atom 
becomes obJect? Then the sense-faculty being the cause; 
would also become iilambana. Thus a fallacy of reason, 
called inconclusiveness (anaikfmtika) has been proved. 
Taen, of what use is this lentence: Because consci-
ousness does not represe~ the image of that? It pur-
ports to establish our own proposition. One cannot 
consider one's proposition to be established by merely 
17a 
criticising other's thesis. This is in order to formulate 
this proposition: The object of com;ciousness is not 
the atom like the sense-faculty, because it dOes not 
produce the consciousness bearing its own form. 
If the above sentence speak of the reason for the 
proposition, it would follow that the author of this 
Sastra (i. e., Dinnaga) having "s:i!t forth at the outset the 
opponents' propositions discloses their consent. With a 
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view to denying what is stated by the opponents the 
author points out the defect on their propositions and 
places accordingly their statements. By doing so the 
author apparently accords his own consent partly to the 
item of the propositions which stands the logical test, and 
expresses his dissent to what stands no such test (by 
18 
saying) that it ,is not acceptable to us 
19 
The disclosure at the outset (i. e. in first logical 
formulation) of the defect of the opponent's inconclu-
sive reasoning serves itself as a criticism. How false 
a syllogism you have maintained? Even the ordinary 
folk says that the reason which is found separated from 
and never associated with the object to be proved is not 
at all a reason, but it gives rise to the doubt as to the 
existem::e of probandum. Therefore other syllogism must 
19a 
be set forth. It may perhaps happen that the atom is 
bereft of the image reflected in the consciousness (atadabha) 
while atoms are indeterminate nature. But the resolve 
that consciousness always arises in co-ordination with 
the image of the object is not correct. Since that resolve 
cannot at aU be possibly upheld, we must say that atoms are 
of indeterminate nature. However, this much follows that 
what produces consciousness does not become its object 
just like the atom of the sense-faculty. There are well-
known other causes which produce the visual conscious-
ness; none of them makes known to us the innate natures 
of atoms, because the consciousness never exhibits that 
form like the other sensuous conci ousness. What has been 
said in respect of the sensuous consciousness must also 
be equally applied to other types of consciousness. 
The sense-faculty given above as example is in fact 
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stated with a view to particularisation (pradadanaaJham). 
Other examples may also be obtained by way of impli-
20 
cation (artr.apntti). Then (the author's) statement accep-
ting the productivity (Kiirnr:ttii) (of the sense-organs) 
2l 
is without any value; because the sense - organs, though 
functioning as causes become no actual objects of cons-
ciousness. So also is the case with this (atom); thus 
the statement becomes really full of value. But never-
theless the atoms of the sound and others would not 
22 
cause to rouse up the consciousness of other sense-organs 
( the eye, etc.) 
Someone says: "Tn the self of consciousn~ss the gro3S 
23 
form is not perceived; "hence does not become object 
just like the atom of the sense-faculty. Because the 
theory that the image of consciousness is due to the 
bringing home of the. object-image upon consciousness 
is not acceptable, the saying that no gross form is per-
ceived I in the self of consciousness) is very appropriate' 
Thus, so far we have spoken that "atoms are not objects 
of consciousness". The reason for this is that they do 
not possess the form (that is experienced in consciousness) 
and the hypothesis that they are its objects ;is not well 
proved by any source of knowledge (pramana). II 1 II • 
If so, (the opponent says:) then let the aggregate 
of atoms be its object. (That could not be possible). 
If you, (says Dharmapala) desire to have a M ahayanic 
thesis by proving the atoms and their aggregates above 
spoken of ; then I may reply that your reason is not 
an established one ~ this will be a true logic. 
146 
f 
[21 "Though the aggregate possesses the image of 
consciousness" and this may become an apparent object: 
it does not, nevertheless, act as its cause. 
"Consciousness does not arise from the aggregate". 
The aggregate does not produce the consciousness which 
bears a form (similar to that of) the aggregate. How 
can this (consciousness) arise depending upon that 
( aggregate )? It means that the aggregate does not 
become its object beuau!le it is endowed with no charac-
teristic of an object (alambanal(]klarla). Therefore the said 
reason of bearing the aggregate-form is not proved. 
What is, then, charaterised as object (iilambana)? 
"What object (artna) produces the consciousness 
reflecting the Image similar to itself (=- 0 bject) that 
24 
is said to de its proper object " 
In accordance with the object, cnsciousness arises; 
so what is pro<;luctive cause of consciousness, that is only 
~5 
its object. Some Hinayanists also say: "What object is 
properly said to be the cause of the mind and mental 
elements, that being produced and cognized as an object 
is spoken of in a common parlance." What object 
possesses the two-fold characteristic (i. e., causality 
and form) that alone combined with that characteristic 
is called iilombo'fla. What is productive of consciousness, 
that becomes its object; To this effect the author (i. e. 
260 
Dinnaga) cites an Agama: 
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"That above is said to be the productive cause of 
consciousness ". 
Therefore what is productive cause, that is the con-
dition for production of its consciousness; that is regarded 
as its perceivable object. There is experienced (in the 
mind) its very self-same image; Therefore the reflection 
of the object-image is not stated (in the Agama). 
"The aggregate of atoms does not produce (its con-
gciusness ); because it is not an entity in substance." 
The aggregate is not a real entity; because it cannot 
26b 
be either differrent from or one with its constituents. 
Whichever is non·entity has possibly no efficiency of 
producing any result. 
(2b) "Like the double moon". 
No second moon could produce the consciousness 
possessed of the form of the second moon. 1f so, what is 
the cause of representing that image that is experienced 
(in the consciousness) ? 
"Because of the defect of the sense-organs" 
26c 
When the eye has its sight disturbed by cataract 
and other diseases, then there arises the appearance of 
the doub1e moon in a person of defective sense- organ; 
and that too is not as a real entity. 
"The double moon-cognition has not its object, 
though the image of the double moon is reflected 
in it". 
Just as the douhle moon is not spoken of as object of its 
consciousness though the latter is endowed with th;! image , 
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of the former (i. e. double moon); because this does not 
produce its consciousness. 
"(Similarly) the aggregate, as it does not exist in 
substance, does not act as cause of its conscious~ 
ness". 
Since it is not a real entity just like the double 
moon it is not at all the cause. Hence 
"it does not become its object". 
Here again the word "the double moon" is to be 
repeated. This repeated double moon-example, it is to be 
understood, points out that the reason, the possession of 
the object-image (by consciousness) is an inconclusive one. 
The existence of an object internally as a part of conci-
ousness could also be proved by a sound logic; hence there 
lurks a defect of contradiction. The (visual) consciousness 
arises depending upon the eye only and not upon the 
aggregateatoms of the blue, etc; because the consciousness 
is not produced from the latter, like the consciousness 
born of other sense-organs. This example is acceptable to 
all and hence no other example is needed. 
The example "double moon" does not exist in subs-
tance; hence, it is to be understood that this (double 
moon) being in the nature of no cause (of double-moon~ 
26a 
consciousness) proves the same (i. e., its non-objectivity). 
(Similarly) the aggregate previously stated, though it is 
endowed with image (of its consciousness) cannot become 
a real object (corresponding to its consciousness). This 
27 
statement again (says that) this (aggregate) is bereft of 
, causality; (hence lacks objectivity). 
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If you ask me: Well, there exists no second moon; 
how does one directly perceive the two images of the moon? 
Let me explain this. Because of some potent force (~akti) 
laid down within consciousness, this consciousness appears 
as though it is endowed with the image of double moon. Just 
as a man, while asleep, dreams that he actually sees many 
objects, and also imagines in dream that he discharges so 
many false acts; so also he imagines another moon upon 
the single one. 
28 
Some philosophers say: When the visual consciou-
sness perceives the moon twjce (i. e., in consequetive two 
moments), and when the order of perceiving it in two 
moments being hardly noticed, one mistakes that percep-
tion to be simultaneous. immediately after this twice 
perceived image a ment:il thou~ht arises murmuring: I per-
cpive the second moon. 
29 
Some others say: It is due to a mistake in number 
(of the two for one) in the moon, that mistakes, too, 
happens out of the defect in the organ of the sight. Even 
for (us) who do not hold the external things to be real 
such vision of gross form is merely a perversive thought. 
(Dharmapala criticises the first view.) No mental 
impression that is brought about just after (twice) perce-
ption of alambana by the visual consciousness graips 
alambana in double form simultaneously. Then how could 
there be a sub- thought that "I see the double moon." Does 
it happen that even in the case of sound, etc. while the 
t~on-sensuous ccnsciousness has arisen dependin~ upon 
l"re souLd, etc. (twice perceived) and not noticing their 





Even for the per~on of sound sense-organs the non-
sensuous consciousness and its order are hardly noticeable 
in several cases. What to speak of that (there is an order) 
in the case of consciousness based on the visible (1'upa) and 
the sense-organ, and in estimating its distinctions. Then, 
in such case the perception in double form (or in triple 
form), etc. would convenien tly be proved. When one acce-
pts that there is one moon substantially existing apart 
from consciousness, with what labour would he too 
maintain the mistake in number falsely assummg the 
double moon? 
(2cd) "There are two things grasped externally 
apart from consciousness". 
Because the atoms and their aggregate are both 
devoid of one or other of two constituents (of ii/ombana) 
and because of the force of logical principle criticising 
what it has been established previously, 
"hoth of them are not proper objects". 
Alambana consists of two parts, viz. presentation 
of its own image and causality for its consciousness. 
The atom lacks in the first part, i. e. its image not 
being presented in consciousness, and the second in the 
second, i. e·, causality. Then these two defects as have 
been discussed so far, point out to the identity between 
th~ object and its consciousness. II 2 II 
30a 
[ 3] "Some Acaryas hold that integrated form of 
atoms (S'aiicitiikara) is the cause of consciousness." 
In each atom there exists the integrated form. 
1hat alone is peH.:eived as an object and imagefuI. The 
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atoms obtained there either more or less in number are 
all substantially existing. The integrated form (existing 
there) produces the consciousness of the form of itself. 
Because it exists substantial1y, 
"It would become an actual object"; 
for, it fulfils the &aid two conditions. This (integrated 
31 
form) is already an accomplished fact. Hence no question 
arises whether the integrated form is the same as the atom 
or different. 
"All things are possessed of many forms". 
These atoms themselves are regarded as possessed 
of atomic form as well integrated form. How can a single 
substance be properly described to possess two forms? All 
things of many forms lie in the combination of material 
elements, i. e, are constituted of four great elements, 
earth, etc. They are naturally possessed each of distinct 
forces (Sakti). The image of the blue and other colours 
is experienced each in accordance with (the nature of) the 
substance and the sense-organ. Amongst atoms of varied 
forms, 
"that integrated form exists" 
Only this form becomes domain of the visual and 
other consciousness: so 1t serves as 
''the direct object of perception". 
If so, why do you not say that the cognition of 
atoms is possessed of the integrated form? (You admit that) 
the atom is of the integrated form. Why do you not 
likewise admit that iti cognition is also of the integrated 
32 
form? Therefore says the author~ 
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"1 here exists the integrated form at atoms". 
This sentence having the nature of a sentence 
formulated to that effect, shows as well that their 
cognition is possessed of the integrated form of atoms. 
If so, each atom has the form of its own. How do you 
say that it has the integrated form? 
(The Opponent says:) The aggregate atoms of the 
matter consisting of different parts are admitted in this 
(our) system of thought. 1he aggregate atoms, since 
they themselves constitute of parts are not existent 
in substance: this has already been appropriately ~tated. 
Why is it then repeated again? There is a motive to 
do so. Though the substance-elements are each different 
in their nature that (integrated) form ( of the atom) is 
present only at a place where atoms are integrated, and 
hence (the integrated form) is experienced there alone; then 
they say that only the intergrated form is perceived and no 
other form (i.e., atomic form). Moreover although all things 
are essentially the aggregates of atoms, nevertheless a thing 
has its own qualities one being superior and the 
33 
other inferior. (The superior quaHty oven30mes the 
34 
inferior one; therefore) we see it in accordance with (the 
nature of) things. For example the expression like "the 
3[) 
hlue colour is earthelement" is as a matter of fact 
correct logically. 
(Dharmapala says:) In case of such an assumption 
(I he following objection crops up.) Suppose a thing deve-
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lopes red colour; in the first moment of the developing 
the red colour other qualitic-s which are more powerful 
will not becoJ1ile out of sight (tho ugh the inferior atomic 
form is invisible). (Is it not then that) your illusive 
talk is made (wrongly) having in view such cases where 
36 
the superior possibly overcomes the inferior? 
(The opponent says:) If so, how do you admit (in 
your Mahayana) that atoms are grasped by none of the five 
senseo!"gans, and how do you again maintain that only 
a man of true knowledge sees the atoms 
(3c) (The reply foJlows): ''The atomic form becomes 
no object of (five-fold sensuous) consciousness". 
This does not become object of the sensuous 
consciousness; hence it is termed beyond the senses. The 
object whkh does not fall within the operation of senses 
ought to be guessed by a true (supramundanc) knowledge 
alone. What is the ~rgument for this? It is simply this: 
the atomic form never comes within the range of our 
direct perception, 
"Just like its solidity and others" 
Solidity, coldness, and others, (blueness. etc.) 
though existing substantially do not become obj~cts 
of the visual and other consciousness because the 
Pl)wcrs of the sense-orglns are fixedly assigned each to 
ranicuJar objects. 
"So also atomic form". 
)his is not contradicted to the well aCCei)ted fact. 
(The opponent objects) : Let the atomic form appear (as 
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f 
perceptible) and not solidity, because they both differ one 
from the other in their nature. (We reply): The 
36a 
paksadharma, probandum, (ie, nl)n - perceptibility) is 
desired to be common to ten bases ayatana; and this 
latter is nothing but great elements. 1 herefore my· 
statement is in no way defective. 
"(Different) perceptions of the pot, cup, etc. /1 3 1/ 
will be identical". 
37 
For you who hold the above opinion, the, sensuous 
cognition that arises relf. ting to the pot and cup 
would be of identical nature; 
for, there is absolutely no difference in the (supposed) 
cognition of its one atom-object; and the sensuous 
cognition is only in accordance wilh that object (i e. 
real atoms) lying in our front, and has accordingly its 
form arison. Therefore the object of cognition does not 
differ. How does one know (the distinction between the 
pot and the cup) ? 
"There exists no distinction whatever amongst the 
atoms of the pot, cup, etc. though the atoms are many 
and their numcer varies in each case). 
This statement says: Though atoms only in their 
illltegrated form become objects of our cognition, never-
theless while the self-nature of the pot, etc. being cogni-
zed, there exists in the selves of many atomic aggre-
38 
~ates no definite division. Since we do not experience 
(as real) the integrated form distir:ct in each aggregate, 
apart from their own real (atomic) forms, the sensual 
cogrrition that is ari~jng depending upon that (forms) 
will be identical. It is thereby settled that the objectivity 
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centres pnly on the self of atoms. Nor does exist in 
the undifferentiated form of atoms a.ny element that 
causes to produce some discriminating and rein-
vestigating tbeJught (T:]uding tb! dIfferentiated gross 
form. e. g. the pot, €t<:.) for. such thllught will he 
a separate one. just like a theJught springing up from a 
39 
blue patch, etc. 
(4 c) ·'If. (the oppcment 
cog..fJition differs on account of 





Here Hlh~ form'~ means the image that brings fortlt 
disti nction. 
"The pot and cup are distinguishable in their forms 
by virtue of th elr different pa rts, neck, belly, 
bottom. etc: and our c{}~nitjon~ differ on thal 
account." 
(The author replies:) 11 is quite true, that distinct 
cognition aris ~s on account of distinct cbje ~t s. 
(4 d) '"But (the different forms) do not exist In 
substance" 
No atoms constituting the object that is 
cognized by the sensuous consciouness. are varied (in 
their size) Though the aggregates of atoms are emperi-
cally tn!f nevertb~'eii tbey, being closely analysed do 
fLOt ran within the cognizance of senses. Nor is it propu 
to say that variety of non-objective thil1g (avigaya vises a) 
{an be called makers of cognitions in different forms 
(The opponent asks:) How do you know that there 
exists no distinction in the form amongst atoms? f 
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( The author replies: ) 
"( It is so) because the atoms are absolutely identical 
in theIr dimension". 
All things are constituted of part., and these things 
necessarily admit of distinct forms. The selves of atoms, 
however, are devoid of any spetial distinction where an 
extreme limit (~an be reached. Therefore how can we 
assisn to it any distillction of form? 
"Though the pot, cup, etc. are 
( 5 a) varied obj~cts, there exists 
distioction in their atomic nature. 
(apparently) are 
absolutely no 
For, anything destitute of parts, neitber increases 
nor decreases. 
"Therefore, it is asserted that 
[5b] the distinctions are in the aggri"gates. 
and not in the substances". 
Everything of spe1iai distinction has forms attributed 
to it; and hence it does not fall wthin the domain of 
sensuous consciousness. Thus there are several criticisms 
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(when one) desires to demonstrate that the atoms have 
different form~. For, the cognitions of the pot, cup, etc. 
do not take a;; objects (he different real entities, just 
like the f\!elings of Suklu, pleasure and Dukha, displea-
sure. (It is made clear so far that) atoms (which are 
equal in size) do not cause to differentiate objects. Nor 
can this (gross) (form be proper nature of that true object 
(i.e., alambana of the visua1 and other consciousness). 
Or "If the cognition differs on account of differcr:-
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ces in the forms of the pot, etc"; whcn this sentence 
intends to show the proposition that the non-dfferentiated 
thing (i. e., atom) becomes no-object, it incurs a logical 
fallacy called Siddha$iidhana, proving of what is already 
proved. The opponent (Vaisesika) holds that atoms which 
constitute the objects are identical in their nature; never-
thelesi ~different cognitions arise on accunt of differences 
in the forms of objects. We also admit that atoms are 
undistinguishable, and hence this incurs the fallacy of 
Siddhasadhana. The sentence: "Because atoms are absolu-
tely identical in their dimension" points out the fallacy of 
Asiddhi, non-acomplishing to the proposition that the 
differnces in substances (Vastu) constitute differences in 
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objects (Artha). 
Or, it makes clear that the sensueus cognitions 
pertaining to the pot, etc. do not bear the images of atoms; 
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hence they are not al:tual objects of their cognisitions in 
as much as they are not objects of other cognitions. By 
"other cognitions" is meant either non-sensuous conscious-
ness or one born of ther senses; for, a cognition of some 
patch of blue having arison, the same cognition does 
not bear the image of some patch of yellow. In view of 
the fact that the selves of atoms are many, they cannot 
be differentiated one another in any way, but the sensuous 
cognitions, however an: distinguishable one another in their 
forms; it becomes evident that the objectof condition (alam-
banapratyaya) is Rot in the nature of atomic f. rm 
(anvakr.r.1) . 
Or, we may take the verse (5 a-b) !o me~m: An 
objection that atoms are distinguishable t y themselves 
has been put forth and answered as before If the 
aggregates of atoms are regard~d as having forms other 
158 
than the ones of atoms; then it is logically to be established 
that those forms of the aggregates :.!re not real. 
Now, in order that a more specific reasonig is 
likewise to I:e established: (the author says): 
(5 cd) "If those atoms are removed one by one, etc. 
When the atoms are removed the perception of 
the pot, etc. do not arise and hence unreal like Sena, 
aq-my and others; therefore they do not exist in substance. 
The following is another mode of reasoning: "What are 
other than the non-substantial things, those things are 
not deviated from the latter" (i. c. Atoms which are 
other than the pot, etc. are not deviated from the pot, etc.) 
This reasoning is contradictory to the real state of things. 
When, c. g. a sound-object is present, no cognition 0f a 
blue patch arises. Thus the (said) distinguished form is a 
form reversed (of what is really there), as it takes as 
object the aggregate like the pot, etc. It may be reasonably 
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stated that the multiplicity (of atoms) is brought home 
(b(>fore our eyes) and some other thing (i. e. the pot, etc.) 
is thought cf; nevertheless it is absolutely impossible to 
prove that the selves of atoms that are substanlially 
existing have any distinction. II 5 II 
(6) "(It is the object) which exists internally in the 
knowledgj itself) as knowable a~pect". 
This establishes what the actual 0 :,ject of conciom-
ness is in our system. If, an object is delilied in general 
then it would evolve lokavirod!w, contradiction to the world, 
a defeet in our proposition. For the scriptUle ~ays: 
There are four conditionS', (for raising up cO~lseiollsness\. 
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The term "internally" is in order to show that 
there is no object-cause apart from the consciousness The 
term jJ1eyarupa, "knowable aspect" shows that the cogni-
zable form is the consciousness-product (Vijfia-parinama) 
:and a cognizable part of consciousness (Griihyiimsa). 
Thus what exists in knowledge itself and is thought of as 
cognizable form is proved to be object. Now the con-
tradiction with the worldly experience again persists; for, 
men of the world all accept the object as eXlernally. 
existing. Therefore the author says:- "as if externally". 
The object, however, does not exist apart from conscious-
ness. Its knowable aspect. 
"Appears to us as if it exists externally". 
The expression "1 see the object exterrally" is based 
on wrong notion, but in fact caused by it ( 
notion); the visual consciousness representing 
of the hair-like object, etc. in the sky is apt 
here. 




i. e. the external thing does not exist in reality, because 
it is not experienced as such. Nor is it found' that its real 
self- substance exists invariably in the extemal even if we 
earnestly se,Hch for it with an extremely subtle reasoning. 
Even thol'gh that thing may be assumed to be existing 
in substance and characterised as eXlernal, nevertheless it 
cannot act as object-cause of consiousness For, couscious-
ness sacs not exhibit its form. Nor is the atomic fonA 
reflt'cted (in our cnngnition). 
That (grai1yarriSa) ~hich appears to us as though 
existent externally, ser'fes as the actual object-condItion, 
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because (that alone) p:>35)s'Se3 th~ for,n of that (i.e. 
object). (To prove the above the following syllogism is 
formulated:) Whatever thing possesses whatever form, 
that thing is identical with that form; for example, the 
causality is possessed of its own form, (i. e. the nature 
of being cause: that causality is not distinct from the 
nature of being cause). 
Again the author shows some distinct character of 
the perceivable object (a/'mban'l) when he says:-
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"Because consciousness is the essence of that (i. e. 
object) etc." 
It is evident that the external thing is non-exi~tent 
and hence the object is not obtainable The form of an 
object follows only in conformity with what is imagined 
by our habitual reckoning (viisMa or tlrka). What is 
imagined by our Viisana does not at all exist externally 
and apart from consciousness. 
"The forms of the (experienced) objects do not, frpm 
the outset exist apart from consciousnessH • 
Hence it h called "knowable aspect of conscious-
ness. The term "internally" indicates that the knowable 
does not exist beyond consciousness. That (knowable) 
non-existent externally by its nature is regarded as 
interna11y existent. 
"It also arises from that" 
lhat part (i. e. arr1.R~'iiFT aAarabJ,aga) is productive 
(of consciousness); from it (= that part) sometimes arises 
consciousness; becaus:! the seventh (con~ciousness) 
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( Klistam manas) has a characteristic distinct from the 
(first) five (consciousness) object-things. Since its 
consciousness is not obtained in separation from its 
knowable aspect (Jfieya) that part (i. e. iikiirabhiiga=rupa= 
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arth(J) produces consciou!:.ness ........ . 
Because (the knowable aspect, grhyamsa) is endowed 
with two qualities (i. e. image and casolity), the same 
will be very well the object-condition as it accords quite 
with logic and it is demonstrated as cause of conscious-
ness (Siidhana). The knowable aspect alone which is 
characterized as having two constituents (of iilambunrt) 
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becomes Sadhana, cause. What is characterized (=KIi.$tam 
manas) that consciousness does not take the external 
thing as the perceivable object; this is experienced in the 
dream-stage. Th"! set of two qualities (dhrtrma) as stated 
above becomes a single cause (eka!11 Siidhanam). Consc.+ 
ousness 0. e. its knowable part) is endowed with the 
form of that (object) and also productive of consciousness; 
on account of these two functions it becomes. a single 
source of knowledge (ekam pfl1manam). 
Now, though what exists internally within consci-
ousness is admitted (as object-condition): 
it is eviden t that the external things are of unreal 
character as analysed above and that there can be no 
other real character thereof. The object-cause is expe-
rienced only iii pursuance of our habitual imagination. 
BUI the image of the object is immanent in conscious-
ness itself, and that alone will be logically correct. (The 
opponent asks) 
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How can a part of consciousnes~ become condition 
to (the consdousness) arising simultaneously? 
(The author replies:) The knowable aspect (grahyamsa) 
does not exist in the absence of consciousness; hence its 
part (Le. knowable asp~ct) gives rise t,) another conscious-
ness. (The opponent continues:) Now, (you have) a logi-
cal fallacy called self-defadng (svatmavirodha) , as it is 
again only a part of consciousness just like its part that 
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cognizes. (How can a grahakamsa produce a grahakam&a? 
Then, in that case the nature of its being cause can 
never be achieved. Moreover, conscious ness arises only 
being discoloured by th~ form~ of external things 1 hat 
image-part itself springs up simultaneously with consci-
ousness. No two things simuHaneously arising can aet 
mutually as cause and effect, e. g. a pair of horns of the 
cow. Moreover it is not proper to say that an object 
which is in fact no other than consciousness itself is co-
existent with it. For, the term "co-existence'" denotes some 
c,)nnection between two di~tinct objects. But you do 
not admit that there is an object distinct from conSC1-
uusness. How is it then termed co-existent? 
4) 
(Dharmapala replies:) It is true. Nevertheless, by 
virtue of distmction in aspects (akara) two distinct parts 
are assumed in t"'1e Alaya consciousness and de£cribed. 
IiO 
1 hus it follows that th.; r.:onsciou ,ness is distinguished and 
differentiated into the perceiving and perceptible aspects. 
(The opponent agajn objects;) If it is so, what consti-
':;1 
tutes patyaya (causal condition) will be the cognizable 
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aspect. Nothing of the assumed character would be 
regarded as possessing the s.lf- substance. And such an 
object turns to be something other than pratyaya. 
(Dharmapala replies:) This is not contradictory (to 
our· experience.) It is an accepted fact that perceivable 
aspect becomes the causal condition, (like) varied objects 
experienced somewhere else. (Such as the flower in the 
sky, or objects in dream etc. which though unreal and 
only images conceived by their thoughts' are accepted as 
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forming causal-conditions.) For example, the disappea-
rance (of the mind and mental states) in the immediately 
preceding moment (samanantararlirodha) is a causal con-
\ 
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dition:- the moment a consciousness of homogeneous 
character (Sabhaga) disappears, the same consciousness is 
54 





1. Cpo Tattvas. pan. p.2C6; ~yayavartika, p. 8C-I Where 
different explanations, are given for rathadiva t. 
2. Lit. Part. bit, bhaga, pienjen (91; 18-2) 
2 a This and the following paragraph critiei~e the theory 
of Mansapratyaksa set' Nyayabindu 1, 
3. whole discussion below, cf. Pramarav£ctikavitti, 11, 
239-244 
4. cf. T.dtvas pan. p.825; Nyayabir:cutika, p. 10. 
5. cpo Pramanasamuccaya J, 21, Sense-organs arc inferred, 
but the mind as the sense-organ cannot be inferred. 
5a A sautdintika view, v, kosavy. p. 352, 8; my paiicaras-
tuka, ] ntro XI. 
6. cf. Nyayavartika. 521 where simila anumana is 
referred to i'f f"'l~c!lfctf<:mr f<!l'f<rr: iJl~';;ffC!rq: ~G<!Tf?':Gfq: I 
Tatparyatika, P.6':6: 3-T<.:r fq~li1ql<"~HCit,~l >,1111J111T~-i'f f:q;i:'f'· 
7. Ref. to the author's ex}:osition of this foint in lhe 
vritti ad ver. 8 with Hsuang Tsang's versions, p. and 
Vinitadeva's Tika. p. 
7a cpo Abhi. kosa: ~~: ~ll1fT1.Ift i!fiR1l1m<rrq: I ;tf'f=q;'fi'/IT: 
tPliJi1.lfT=-· ~W;;i:lTi'ft 'fiT~urcGfTq: J, ver. 20. 
7b c.J flv~ objecls. C. II five senses. 
~. cf. Slokavartika, 285: '3"(qTG'f'-~<!T~t:¢[;;Hql1: I V. Pramana-
varti ka 11. 224: ~i1\l~a ilFQT iJ T~«<'IT i'fPl 'fiRi'f I V p. 12 
ahove Pro var. 246: fGfl'f1:f: 'fin1.lfT~ : I <!T<tin1.lf fG"!'f1:f :-]bid, 
257. 
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9. Ref. Pramanavartika, II, 224: ~ii1' iF~l.Wfi'ru et~(w,{«~'!I!:;;!1) 
Vi tti: «~'qI!:;;:ffiSTJI~r>"flf: I 
9a This shows that the advocate of the atom-object 
does not deny the image of the object in cons-
ciousness. But this is rather incorrect. See Vinita. 
Tika. p. 8(Ms). Dharmapala seems to have the same 
idea, See below p!l2his Tika. 
to. Here we have to omit the negative particle pu in 
Chinese to make the sense much clearer; for, it has 
been pointed out that in the two previous proposi-
tions there is no homogeneous example even though 
an appropriate reason, hetu, is stated in each case, 
see notes to the Sanskrit text, 14a and 15a. 
11. Samudaya. cf. the Pramanavartika cited in the 
pp. 16, 24 above and the Vaisesikasutra, I, 1-21:-. 
12. According to C.I. C. II. has: Svatma-virodha-dosa, 
Contradiction with its own (consciousness) self. 
13. According to C. L 
14. These 2 hetus: Vijnana-j,,l,nakatva and akaratva are 
stated by the Vaibhasika and the Saulrantika. v p. 
13f. above 
15. See Hetubindutika, p. 13. 'l fi'[ ~1'.iC:Fer;r;:jtur ~d'): urEit'l <HUM: 
sr~ITf~i!' ~iifq'~ I and p. 39. tf~lfl'q~~lJ srN4l1f 3fTfrit~ Cfl 
srHrf.g,-: I cpo Nyayamukha, p. 13, n. 20 
16. Cpo Pra. vartika-vrtti p. 230: arT'fin:rc:TlJffcf fCfl':fI:(~Ifl'IJf~ 
11. Acc lrding to C II. see note 27 to Dharma. Tika. 
17a Cfr. Pramlnanayatattvaloka of Vadideva suri, Jast 
page. 
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18. See Note 31 to Dh. Tika. 
19. See Note 32 (Ibid) for interpretations of this pal a 
in CI and cn 
19a Lit. (we) set forth other syllogism. 
20. J- chun (123-7); (85-10)= "meaning - criterion." 
21. The interpretation according to cn. See Nute 35 
to Dh. Tikii. 
22. According to C. f1 
23. Cpo Pramanavartika-vrtti II. 211: a-~IlFilT~ i'f"'i:nni't ~~T­
'41H1 f(,!~I~ifi'f": ! 
24. See vrtti ad. ver. 2. 
25. See Note 39. (Dh. Tikii) cpo Kosavyakhya, I, p.46: 
tr~ CTq~q·.mrr CTt:T~m: 
26. More Lit. "in accordance with an object". 
26a According to VinHadeva this is Sastra. p. 151 below. 
The idea seems to he like this: The Agama=.=Sastra 
does not speak of the object image, Visayakara be-
cause the co-ordination theory is unknown to it. The 
reason probably is that according to some early 
Buddhists, the form of the object is a mental image. 
v. Bahyarth(!siddhi, vpr. 36, note 61. (p. 39). 
26b Contrast the opinion of the Vaibhasikas referred to 
in the Kosavva. (B.B. 89.20. the Kosa (Tib. Text) 
I. P. 83, 1. IS :-- i'f" ;:r 'T ~ 'iflT 'vir ;:iT ~Fl'T:fr: <PH <flITf"l'liT: 'li'C;T'lf;: i , ~ 
See Dh. Tika, note 44 b. for Dignaga's reverse 
OpmIOI1. 
26c Cpo N. Sutra, iv, 2,13: iF1IT 
with N. Vartika P. 508. 
26d See to c.l. This is purvapaksa. v Note 48 (Dh. Tika) 
'27 See Noh' 49 (Dh. Tika) 
(167) 
28. See Pramanavartika, II, 294: and n. 256 with vrtti : 
q~ ~)~ltt; (=";"(JH~!l'~) 3ffiilf~~;1fT tT 'lr~j i'mtftffff: 'lfilnf~ I 
ff~<1rtf"rf~'«f!~:jf+r~~-:r::-", ;; f!!'il{ I fer!J)~(lf~roff : -
See also ver II. 502-504 & 507-12 
29. See Prakaranapaiijika, p 38, verses 58-60; Slokav. 
NiraL 54 with Partha Sirathi's comment, Pramana-
var. II, 505-12 
30. Ibid. II 570. 
30a cpo ~f.s:qCfr<1;'frrr: 'lS:qf'f~n;;''ijT':n: I 10 the KOSlvy:i. ad. 
ver 30. p. 47, 18 (B.B.) 
31. Lit. to beseach and advance. 
32. The author says from the standpoint of the opponent. 
33. Superior and=integrated form Salicitij,~ra, inferior 
=atomic f.,rm, parim::m,da [ya. - C II 
34. According to C. II 
35. It is explained: Saiicit'iil{jjra of blue colour is superior, 
and atomic form of tlae earth-element inferior. 
Hence seeing only the blue c'11our, one knows it 
as earth-element. - C. II, 207 b2. 
36. The interpretation is according to C. II; See Note 
63 (Dh.Tika) 
36a Consult note. 67 (Dh.Tika) 
37. i.e. the visible, Sancila, is of atomic self-form, 
p:lramiinUsvarilpa. 
38. Lit parts =pien-fen. 
39. After all the bIu.! p:ltch n~ver produces the cogni-
tion of th~ yellow patch. Now if the many atoms 
of the result and objective, the pot, etc. just rem~in 
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many atoms, they will not separately produce 
different cogni tions of the pot, etc. C.II. 208b,1. 
(Dh.Tika) 
40. This is according to C.l. 195, 62. But C. II 
(208, 62) interprets that consciousness has -
41. The objective differences are not in atom.s. There-
fore the Hinayanists say in vain that atoms have 
differences - C II, 209, a1. 
42. According to C.I, the pot, etc. 
43. (Atoms) in aggregales can be definitely removed 
one by one. When they are not done so, the pot, 
etc. are only perceived and not atoms. After remo-
ving the atoms, the form of the pot is not there. 
Then the pot is not real. Atoms, however, are not 
actual objects. Therefore that mUltiplicity - cn, 
209,bL 
44. That likiirabhogfl. IS only consciousness-product 
( VijiUJna-p" r ir;lima) 
45. Chin. literaJIy reads: "Because consciousness posses 
the form of the object". 
45a The expressi on 'na paficama', etc is left untranslated, 
as its meaning is not clear. 
46. Lit. if the consciousness, etc. 
47. That is to say: things experienced in dream-thought 
are not external, but they prove to internal, c.t. 
198,b2. 
48. Added from C.lI of 21O.a2. 
(' ( 
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4E), According to C.U. we must supply here Diiinaga's 
reply: pratyayo' vyabhicliritvlit ....... . 
50. Or "then it follows", Sui-Chiang (162-9, 41-9). 
51. See ParthaSarathiMisra, Slokavllrtikavyakhya, p.30lh 
<tiR1lT~ '+f'llRft m~lf (ifi( I 
52. A dded from C. II, 2lO, b 1. 
53. Explained in C.II. Thus : Mind and mental states 
(cittacaitta) that disappeared in the immediately pre-
ceding movement, e.g. while a consciousness of 
homogeneous character disappears, the previously 
disappeared mind though not different, becomes. 
Samanantarapratyaya of the following one. Ibid. 
54. Four modes of conditions are: hetu, iilambana 
$amanantara and adhipati. 
170 
